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Abstract
This article studies the significance of insights from non-
legal disciplines (such as political science, economics, and
sociology) for comparative legal research and the methodol-
ogy connected with such ‘interdisciplinary contextualisa-
tion’. Based on a theoretical analysis concerning the nature
and methodology of comparative law, the article demon-
strates that contextualisation of the analysis of legal rules
and case law is required for a meaningful comparison
between legal systems. The challenges relating to this con-
textualisation are illustrated on the basis of a study of the
judicial use of comparative legal analysis as a source of
inspiration in the judgment of difficult cases. The insights
obtained from the theoretical analysis and the example are
combined in a final analysis concerning the role and method
of interdisciplinary contextualisation in comparative legal
analysis conducted by legal scholars and legal practitioners.
Keywords: comparative law, legal methodology, interdisci-
plinary incorporation, judicial use of comparative law
1 Introduction
In John Irving’s novel, The World According to Garp,1
the protagonist warns his son for the undertow when
going for a swim in the sea. The boy mistakenly under-
stands there to be an ‘under toad’ and imagines a scary
creature lurking in the water to catch him. The incorpo-
ration of interdisciplinary insights in comparative legal
analysis holds a risk similar to the misunderstanding
between Garp and his son.2 The meaning of a foreign
legal concept can be hard to grasp for someone who is
just getting acquainted with the system to which this
concept is connected. Obstacles exist in the form of the
unfamiliar sound of foreign legal terminology and the
absence of knowledge of the foreign system’s character-
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1. J. Irving, The World According to Garp (1978).
2. Comparative law can be considered as a method, consisting of the com-
parative study of law. It can also be seen as a body of knowledge con-
cerning the substantive laws of different legal systems. Concerning this
distinction, see M. Siems, Comparative Law (2014), at 5-6. This article
focuses on comparative law as a method, which will be referred to
hereafter as ‘comparative legal analysis’.
istics, history, and political and societal context. To
overcome these obstacles, comparative legal analysis
requires the development of an understanding of the
examined foreign law and the society in which this law
operates.3 In other words, comparative legal analysis
requires contextualisation.
However, the collection of relevant contextual insights
and the incorporation of these insights in legal analysis
are not self-evident. Indeed, methodological choices are
required concerning the scope of contextual research
that is required in order to produce an adequate com-
parative legal analysis and concerning the appropriate
concepts, theories, and methods to be ‘borrowed’ from
non-legal disciplines.4 Furthermore, the comparative
researcher will need to consider how and to what extent
the obtained contextual insights can be translated into
the language of legal doctrine. Which disciplines should
be consulted and how should these be used in a compar-
ative analysis concerning debated legal issues in national
societies, such as the acknowledgement of ‘wrongful life’
claims or the extradition of citizens suspected of crimi-
nal acts to a legal system which still applies the death
penalty?5
This article analyses the need for and the challenges of
contextualisation in comparative legal research. The
starting point of this contribution is the idea that the
demand of a contextual understanding of compared
legal rules implies an interdisciplinary research
approach. I will argue that comparative legal analysis
should refer to background information on foreign legal
systems obtained through studies from the perspective
of non-legal disciplines, such as history, economics,
political science, and sociology. Furthermore, I will ana-
lyse how relevant insights from research in these other
disciplines can be collected and integrated in the legal
analysis of foreign law and in the comparison of selected
laws from different jurisdictions. In this regard, the arti-
3. M. Van Hoecke and M. Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms
and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495, at 498 (1998). See
further below, Section 2.1. The terms ‘research’ and ‘analysis’ are used
in this article with a similar meaning. However, the term ‘research’ is
generally more strongly connected with scholarship, whereas the term
‘analysis’ is more neutral with regard to the work of academics and
legal professionals.
4. Concerning types of interdisciplinary legal research, see S. Taekema and
B. van Klink, ‘On the Border: Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary
Research’, in B. van Klink and S. Taekema (eds.), Law and Method:
Interdisciplinary Research into Law (2011) 7, at 10-13.
5. See further below, Section 3.2.
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cle’s central research question is: To what extent is it need-
ed and possible to include interdisciplinary insights regard-
ing foreign law and societies in comparative legal research?
In order to illustrate the methodological possibilities and
limitations of contextualised comparative legal analysis,
furthermore, the article addresses a specific area in
which this type of analysis has become more prominent
and debated in recent years. This area concerns the
judicial recourse to foreign law in deliberations and in
the reasoning of judgments, in particular at the level of
national highest courts. In the globalised legal context,
national supreme courts and constitutional courts
increasingly refer to legal sources from other jurisdic-
tions (statutory provisions, case law) when deciding
domestic cases.6 Sometimes, this practice consists of a
mere citation of foreign law, but in other instances, a
comparison is conducted between domestic and foreign
legal sources.7 However, judges struggle to find an ade-
quate methodological approach regarding this use of
foreign law.8 Starting out from this observation, a sub-
question addressed in this article is: How is the incorpo-
ration problem handled in comparative legal analysis con-
ducted in the framework of judicial decision-making?
This article presents a legal-theoretical analysis and uses
an illustration from comparative legal and socio-legal
analysis. The legal-theoretical analysis, firstly, is based
on academic literature concerning the nature and partic-
ularities of comparative legal research. The input from
comparative legal and socio-legal analysis, secondly, is
connected with the example regarding the use of foreign
law in judicial decision-making.9 In connecting the two
strands of the analysis, differences between the method-
ology of legal research and judicial decision-making are
taken into account. It seems that the step of interpreta-
tion of the law is mostly identical for researchers and
judges, although carried out with a different aim.10
However, when considering the justification of used
sources, judicial reasoning is often less elaborate and
sometimes different from academic legal reasoning.11
The article will address these similarities and differen-
ces and discuss their implications for different types of
comparative legal analysis.
As a preliminary step, Section 2 sets out in more detail
what the incorporation problem in comparative legal
research consists of. Attention is paid to the inherent
interdisciplinary nature of this type of research and the
particularities of the research approach relating to spe-
6. See inter alia B. Markesinis and J. Fedtke, Judicial Recourse to Foreign
Law (2006); T. Groppi and M.C. Ponthoreau (eds.), The Use of Foreign
Precedents by Constitutional Judges (2013).
7. See below, Section 3.
8. This is illustrated very clearly by the debate in the United States, where
Supreme Court Justices disagree about the legitimacy and usefulness of
citations to foreign law. See N. Dorsen, ‘The Relevance of Foreign Legal
Materials in US Constitutional Cases: A Conversation between Justice
Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer’, 3 International Journal of
Constitutional Law 519 (2005).
9. E. Mak, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised World: A Compara-
tive Analysis of the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts
(2013).
10. J. Vranken, Asser Algemeen Deel**** (2014), at nr. 184.
11. Ibid. See further below, Section 2.2.
cific types of comparative legal analysis. Next, Section 3
illustrates this incorporation problem with regard to the
contextualisation of foreign law in the judicial use of
comparative law. This analysis addresses theoretical
views and examples from case law regarding the use of
comparative law in judgments of highest national courts
in Western jurisdictions. Section 4 connects the find-
ings of the analysis in Section 3 with the broader topic
of comparative legal research. This section outlines
methodological considerations relating to judicial com-
parisons, including the relevance of contextual aspects,
and distinguishes similarities and differences with com-
parative legal scholarship. Section 5 contains some con-
cluding remarks.
2 The Incorporation Problem
in Comparative Legal
Analysis
Comparative legal scholars recognise the significance of
a contextual understanding of the social and cultural
setting in which the law operates in different legal sys-
tems. In this respect, it can be said that there is an
inherent interdisciplinary aspect in comparative legal
analysis (Section 2.1). However, this aspect raises some
specific issues of research methodology regarding the
required degree of interdisciplinary contextualisation in
comparative legal analysis (Section 2.2).
2.1 An Inherent Interdisciplinary Aspect
Traditional legal scholarship regarding national systems
concerns the construction, evaluation, and reform of
legal doctrine.12 Comparative legal analysis shares this
perspective and in this sense represents ‘an instance of
the more general form of legal research’.13 Nonetheless,
comparative law has a distinct feature when compared
to traditional legal research. Scholars in the field of
comparative law have argued that comparative legal
research should focus on ‘law as culture’ rather than
‘law as rules’, indicating ‘that law, and the understand-
ing of law, involves much more than the mere reading of
statutory rules and judicial decisions’.14 In this regard,
Van Hoecke and Warrington have stated that ‘law and
legal practice are one aspect of the culture to which they
belong’.15 The understanding of the context in which
law operates then becomes significant for a fruitful com-
parison between legal systems. Considered from this
perspective, a comparison of the laws of different legal
systems requires that the analysis takes into account
legal culture, meaning the ‘specific way in which values,
12. S. Taekema, ‘Relative Autonomy: A Characterisation of the Discipline of
Law’, in van Klink and Taekema (eds.), above n. 4, 33, at 35.
13. J. Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’, in
M. Van Hoecke (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research. Which Kind of
Method for What Kind of Discipline? (2011), at 175.
14. Van Hoecke and Warrington, above n. 3, at 496.
15. Ibid., at 498.
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practices, and concepts are integrated into the operation
of legal institutions and the interpretation of legal texts’.16
Another characteristic of comparative legal research is
that the construction of a legal analysis based on compa-
rative knowledge requires an explicit justification of
methodological choices. Such a justification is often
more implicit in the analysis of a single legal system.
The comparative legal researcher needs to consider
which systems are taken into account in the research, for
which reasons, and in which way. In this sense, compa-
rative legal methodology might be distinguishable from
legal methodology generally, which often focuses on
research of the ‘law in the books’.17 Comparative legal
methodology then also provides lessons for traditional
legal research, as ‘it makes us aware of the elements
which are influencing the law at all levels, it confronts
us with our hidden conceptual, ideological
framework’.18 Still, the extent to which interdisciplinary
elements are taken into account in comparative legal
analysis is dependent on the focus and aim of the com-
parative research.
2.2 The Degree of Interdisciplinary
Contextualisation
When considering the methodology of comparative legal
analysis, some further observations can be made.
Indeed, the extent to which interdisciplinary insights
are needed in comparative legal analysis varies based on
a number of factors. These factors concern the research
focus (Section 2.2.1), the object of the comparative anal-
ysis (Section 2.2.2), and the aim of the analysis (Section
2.2.3).
2.2.1 Research Focus: Functionalism versus
  Contextualism
In terms of research methodology, insights produced by
research in non-legal disciplines can assist in obtaining
historical, political, economic, and other explanations
regarding the law and the way it operates in a specific
jurisdiction. However, comparative legal analysis which
makes use of interdisciplinary insights is still legal-doc-
trinal analysis, in the sense that the comparative legal
researcher does not conduct research using the methods
of other disciplines.19 Two main approaches to compa-
rative legal research can be identified. The first one
focuses on similarities between legal systems, primarily
16. J. Bell, ‘English Law and French Law – Not So Different?’, 48 Current
Legal Problems 63, at 70 (1995). Cited by Van Hoecke and Warrington,
above n. 3, at 498.
17. K. Lemmens, ‘Comparative Law as an Act of Modesty: A Pragmatic and
Realistic Approach to Comparative Legal Scholarship’, in M. Adams and
J. Bomhoff (eds.), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (2012) 302,
at 312-13.
18. Van Hoecke and Warrington, above n. 3, at 497. See also Lemmens,
above n. 17, at 313.
19. This approach could be called multidisciplinary rather than interdiscipli-
nary. It concerns the combination of methods, not an integrated
research approach. Compare Taekema and van Klink, above n. 4, at 10.
An approach which takes a step further is ‘socio-legal comparative
research’. This type of comparative research concerns the study of legal
culture as such. It uses empirical methods to describe the context in
which law operates and to establish relations of causality between the
development of law and society. See Siems, above n. 2, at 121-22.
with regard to legal rules, and the second one on differ-
ences between legal systems, in particular relating to
context.20
Traditional comparative legal analysis, firstly, generally
starts out from an existing socio-economic problem, tak-
ing a so-called ‘functionalist’ approach.21 A first step in
the research is to describe the situation selected for anal-
ysis, that is, to ‘construct comparables’ or system-neu-
tral descriptions.22 Next, the selected legal orders are
described. Thirdly, the actual comparison takes place,
resulting in an overview of similarities and differences,
and an explanation is provided for the identified similar-
ities and differences.23 Concerning this explanation,
arguments can only be speculative unless other disci-
plines are used to obtain insight into the context in
which the examined legal rules have been developed and
operate.24
Postmodern comparative legal analysis, by contrast,
emphasises the complexity of legal systems and focus on
differences rather than on similarities between
systems.25 Postmodern approaches start out from the
idea that comparative legal analysis is never neutral, as
the researcher’s reasoning and assessment take place
within specific epistemic, linguistic, cultural, and moral
frameworks.26 In this field, the stream of ‘deep-level
comparative law’ claims that the traditional approach
cannot yield more than a shallow understanding of the
similarities and differences between legal systems.27 The
stream of critical comparative law questions the validity
of the outcomes of traditional comparative analysis alto-
gether.28
Both approaches are vulnerable to criticism. Functional-
ist approaches can be accused of focusing too much on
black-letter law, thereby ignoring relevant differences
between the contexts of legal systems. Postmodern
approaches can be criticised for not fully supporting
certain premises with a solid argumentation, for exam-
ple, concerning the alleged fundamental differences
between legal systems.29
When comparing the role of interdisciplinary contextu-
alisation in the two approaches, it appears that the
incorporation of interdisciplinary insights in compara-
tive legal analysis has a more prominent place in post-
modern approaches than in the traditional approach to
comparative legal analysis. A ‘deep-level’ understanding
of legal systems requires the study of the context in
which legal rules function. This study might include,
inter alia, the use of insights from the perspective of
20. Compare J. Husa, ‘About the Methodology of Comparative Law: Some
Comments concerning the Wonderland…’, Maastricht Faculty of Law
Working Paper 2007/5.
21. Siems, above n. 2, at 13; Van Hoecke and Warrington, above n. 3, at
495; Lemmens, above n. 17, at 321.
22. Lemmens, above n. 17, at 320.
23. Ibid., at 321-22.
24. Ibid., at 322.
25. Siems, above n. 2, at 97.
26. Ibid., at 98.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., at 108.
29. Ibid., at 117.
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economics, political science, or sociology. Critical
awareness demands the study of the cultural and other
aspects of the researcher’s framework of analysis, possi-
bly by referring to insights from linguistic and cultural
research.30 Still, the differences between these two
approaches should not be exaggerated. Indeed, compa-
rative legal research might combine the analysis of rules
and contexts and then requires ‘a sliding scale of methods
fitted to the purpose of present comparative study’.31 In
this regard, the methodology of a specific comparative
study should be adapted to the object of the research
and to the aim of the research.
2.2.2 Research Object
Concerning the object of the analysis, the interdiscipli-
nary aspect of comparative legal analysis is subject to
variation on the basis of the examined field of law, the
research question, and the research methods.
Firstly, the relevant discipline to be taken into account
can differ depending on the examined field of law. In
this regard, an economic perspective might be more use-
ful in the field of private law, where this perspective can
provide relevant insights into human behaviour and in
this way contribute to the development of effective rules
concerning the regulation of private legal interactions.
By contrast, political science might offer more valuable
insights for the field of constitutional and administrative
law.32 Indeed, constitutional law and political theory are
closely connected and are combined, for example, in
research regarding political practices and constitutional
history.33
Secondly, the particularities of the research question
should be considered. Vranken has argued that interdis-
ciplinary insights are required when arguments with an
empirical connotation play a role in legal reasoning.34
Empirical data are not always required, for example, if a
legal research question is purely theoretical or concerns
a question of systemising. However, when questions
with an empirical connotation occur, fact-checking is
generally recommended.35 Examples of research ques-
tions with an empirical aspect are those involving argu-
ments concerning: reasonable and context-oriented
interpretation; feasibility; effective legal protection; the
efficiency of laws; preventive effect; and the demands of
society or of the parties. Interdisciplinary research is
also required to verify the validity of statements about
the consequences of specific points of view in legal rea-
soning; for example, the argument that accepting a spe-
30. Ibid.
31. Husa, above n. 20, at 16, citing V.V. Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando:
Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’, 4 Global Jurist
Frontiers (2004, nr. 2).
32. Siems, above n. 2, at 9, citing D. Nelken, ‘Comparative Law and Com-
parative Legal Studies’, in E. Örücü and D. Nelkin (eds.), Comparative
Law: A Handbook (2007) 3, at 17.
33. S. Halliday, ‘Public Law’, in C. Hunter (ed.), Integrating Socio-Legal
Studies into the Law Curriculum (2012), at 141.
34. J. Vranken, ‘“Wij weten wel wat we doen”. Over juridisch-dogmatisch
onderzoek in het privaatrecht, maar wel een slag anders’, 89 Neder-
lands Juristenblad 1728, at 1733 (2014). See also Vranken, above n.
10.
35. Ibid.
cific claim will prompt a stream of further court cases
(‘floodgates argument’).36 Research questions address-
ing such issues will demand an interdisciplinary
approach, whether or not a legal comparison between
different jurisdictions forms part of the research.
Finally, the selection of legal systems for the comparison
is of significance. In this regard, an important limitation
to the possibilities of comparative legal analysis relates
to the differences between specific legal cultures in
terms of opposing basic values of rationalism-irrational-
ism and individualism-collectivism, in particular
between Western legal culture, Asian legal culture,
Islamic legal culture, and African legal culture.37 Van
Hoecke and Warrington have argued that in their
approach, which they call ‘law as culture’, comparative
legal analysis can take place at three levels, concerning
the comparison between: (i) legal cultures at a global
scale; (ii) legal families, sharing a similar historic and
socio-economic basis; and (iii) legal systems, sharing the
same legal culture, concepts, and legal language.38 Each
of these three levels requires a different methodology,
taking account the degree of shared elements between
the compared cultures, traditions, or systems.39
Besides these factors relating to the object of the analy-
sis, the role of interdisciplinary contextualisation further
depends on the aim of the comparative research.
2.2.3 Research Aim
Comparative legal analysis can serve different purposes.
Depending on the aim of the analysis, interdisciplinary
insights concerning the social and cultural setting in
which the law operates are of lesser or greater relevance.
This can be clarified by considering three different gen-
eral aims of comparative legal analysis. These aims are:
(i) the collection of knowledge regarding legal rules and
their functioning in context; (ii) the search of guidance
for legal practice; and (iii) the search of guidance for the
harmonisation of laws.40
Firstly, an aim of comparative legal analysis can be to
obtain knowledge of foreign legal rules or an under-
standing of how legal rules work in context. Compara-
tive law then enables a reflection on the laws of one’s
own system or the identification of historical origins,
current trends, and political, cultural, and socio-eco-
nomic reasons explaining similarities and differences
between the rules of different legal systems.41 Legal
scholarship offers countless examples of this type of
comparative legal research. Indeed, Jan Vranken has
observed that the incorporation of a comparative analy-
sis has become fairly usual in Dutch PhD theses in the
field of private law.42
36. Ibid.
37. Van Hoecke and Warrington, above n. 3, at 503-8.
38. Ibid., at 519-20 and 532-33.
39. Ibid., at 510.
40. Siems, above n. 2, at 2-5.
41. Ibid., at 2-3.
42. Vranken, above n. 10, at nr. 18. Vranken argues that when setting up
research on a specific question of private law, a check should be done
on whether the research requires a comparative analysis, an analysis of
European law, and/or a multidisciplinary analysis. Ibid., chapter 6.
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Research conducted with this general aim of knowledge
building or the study of the ‘law in action’ will pay equal
attention to the contextual understanding of all legal
systems included in the analysis. Moreover, this analysis
will be thorough and include perspectives from non-
legal disciplines in order to sketch a complete picture. It
is generally connected with legal scholarship. However,
a distinction can be made between comparisons of dif-
ferent ‘weight’, defined by Husa as the degree of sys-
tematic and interdisciplinary analysis in comparative
legal research.43 Comparative legal analysis aimed at
knowledge building concerns the research of the field-
of-law academic, who uses a ‘middleweight comparison’
for the analysis of laws within a specific conceptual
framework. It also concerns the comparative law aca-
demic, who uses a ‘heavyweight comparison’ to explain
similarities and differences between legal systems.44
Secondly, comparative law can be of practical assistance
to legislators, judges, and other practising lawyers in
national legal systems. Comparative law needs to be
considered in cases of conflicts of law, and it can serve
as an inspirational source in law reforms or the deciding
of difficult cases.45 Examples in the field of conflicts of
law concern the comparison between the legal rules of
two different jurisdictions regarding a specific legal
issue, such as marriage or parental authority.46 An
example of inspiration drawn from comparative law in
the field of constitutional reform concerns the Bill sub-
mitted to the Dutch Parliament by Member of Parlia-
ment Femke Halsema in 2002 regarding the amendment
of Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution. This provision
prohibits judicial review of Acts of Parliament in light of
the Constitution. Halsema presented systems of review
in European countries and in the United States to justi-
fy allowing the judicial review of statutory acts in light
of fundamental rights provisions contained in the Con-
stitution.47 Comparative law was also used by the State
Committee chaired by Wilhelmina Thomassen, which
advised the Dutch Government on possible reforms of
the Constitution. In its Report, issued in 2010, this
Committee referred to the Constitutions of other Euro-
pean countries to support its suggestions concerning the
revision of the Dutch Constitution.48
In this type of comparative legal analysis, the main aim
is to present a persuasive argument concerning the
applicable law in the domestic jurisdiction or to defend
an argument in favour of a reform of the law. Contextu-
al elements of the law will be studied in order to assess
the possibilities of interpreting legal rules in conformity
with each other or to assess the usefulness of foreign
legal arguments for the reasoning in domestic cases.
43. Husa, above n. 20, at 17-18.
44. Ibid., at 18.
45. Siems, above n. 2, at 3-4. See also N. Lupo and L. Scaffardi (eds.),
Comparative Law in Legislative Drafting: The Increasing Importance of
Dialogue amongst Parliaments (2014).
46. See M. Reimann, ‘Comparative Law and Private International Law’, in
M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Compa-
rative Law (2006).
47. Kamerstukken II, 2001/2002, 28 331, nr. 3.
48. State Committee on the Constitution, Report State Committee (2010).
Husa has argued that the interest in obtaining inspira-
tion from foreign law might be satisfied through a
‘feather weight comparison’, which is functionalist and
non-systematic.49
Finally, comparative law can have a practical role at the
international and supranational level in the context of
formal unification of law or gradual convergence of legal
systems.50 Vranken has argued that comparative law is
required for successful internationalisation, because of
comparative law’s contribution to a better understand-
ing of the domestic law as well as the insight it provides
into the differences between legal systems.51 From a
bottom-up perspective, comparative law can guide the
development of national legal systems. In this regard,
comparative law is used in order to realise the harmoni-
sation of laws in the European Union. An example con-
cerns the development of harmonised contract law,
which has resulted in the Principles of European Con-
tract Law (PECL), drafted by the Lando Commission,52
and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),
prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code
and the Research Group on EC Private Law.53 From a
top-down perspective, comparative law can guide the
development of international and supranational law by
institutions at these levels. In this regard, comparative
law plays a role with regard to the application of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) considers
the existence of consensus amongst the contracting
states when interpreting provisions of the ECHR. In
this way, the Court aims to provide effective protection
of fundamental rights and to ensure that states follow its
judgments.54
In this type of comparative legal analysis, contextual
aspects regarding the law and its functioning in member
states of the EU and contracting states of the ECHR will
be taken into account in order to determine the limits of
unification or convergence of legal systems. Husa has
connected the harmoniser’s interest in comparative law
with the method of a ‘lightweight comparison’, in which
the search for the ‘most fitting’ model is central.55
When comparing these three possible aims of compara-
tive legal analysis, the first aim is most neutral in its
scope and its inclusion of contextual elements. The sec-
ond and third aims entail the use of the outcomes of the
comparative research for the support of a specific legal
argument. In this respect, the comparative analysis
might lack a systematic approach or the presented work
(e.g. a judgment or proposal of law reform) might only
present a selection of the outcomes. Also, there might be
49. Husa, above n. 20, at 17.
50. Siems, above n. 2, at 4-5.
51. Vranken, above n. 10, at nr. 23.
52. O. Lando et al., Principles of European Contract Law (2000).
53. C. von Bar et al. (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of
European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)
(2009).
54. K. Dzehtsiarou, ‘European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation
of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 12 German Law Jour-
nal 1730 (2011).
55. Husa, above n. 20, at 18.
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more emphasis on similarities between legal rules and
contextual aspects, based on a functionalist approach.
With regard to the interest in interdisciplinary contex-
tualisation, a practical concern should be mentioned
here as well. Some non-legal research methods are easier
for legal scholars to master or to understand than others.
In this regard, a difficulty is that legal researchers are
not trained to conduct empirical research or to assess
the outcomes of research in non-legal disciplines. More-
over, from a practical point of view, it is possible that no
empirical data can be obtained or not at short notice, in
particular concerning the consequences of specific views
on the law.56 In practice, the availability of time and
resources for interdisciplinary research can therefore
constrain the possibility of contextualisation of compa-
rative legal research.
Keeping these particularities in mind, we will consider
an example in order to clarify the role of interdisciplina-
ry insights in comparative legal analysis and the chal-
lenges of interdisciplinary incorporation. This example
concerns the developing trend of the judicial use of
comparative law.




The need and challenge of contextualisation in compa-
rative legal analysis has manifested itself in a poignant
manner in legal practice, in particular with regard to the
judicial use of comparative law. This practice of judicial
citation to foreign law is considered to form part of
the broader phenomenon of ‘transjudicial communica-
tion’.57 This section focuses on the question of the
incorporation of interdisciplinary insights in judicial
reasoning which makes use of comparative legal analy-
sis. Firstly, two different accounts regarding the theo-
retical understanding of interdisciplinary incorporation
in comparative judicial reasoning are presented (Section
3.1). Secondly, an analysis of examples from case law in
light of these theoretical accounts clarifies how courts
have dealt with the use of interdisciplinary insights in
comparative analyses conducted in specific difficult
cases (Section 3.2). Based on this analysis, an intermedi-
ary conclusion is presented (Section 3.3).
56. Vranken, above n. 34, at 1733.
57. A.M. Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, 29 Uni-
versity of Richmond Law Review 99 (1994).
58. With thanks to Bald de Vries and Kees Quist for bringing the divergence
between these views to my attention.
3.1 Interdisciplinary Incorporation: Two
Accounts of the Judicial Use of Foreign
Law58
The use of contextualised comparative information in
the legal reasoning of courts entails two general aspects.
Firstly, comparative law should be used in a legitimate
manner in judicial reasoning. With regard to Western
legal systems, this means that the reasoning of judg-
ments should meet the demands of the liberal-demo-
cratic normative framework for legal interpretation and
judicial decision-making.59 Secondly, limitations to the
possibility of legal transplants should be acknowledged
in comparative legal reasoning.60 These requirements
form part of the methodology regarding the use of com-
parative law in judicial decision-making. Still, there is
no general agreement in legal scholarship concerning
the exact methodology used by courts. This section
investigates two different views which legal theorists
have presented regarding the role and method of con-
textualisation in comparative judicial reasoning. These
views can be considered as complementing one another.
However, they choose different points of focus. One
view emphasises the comparison of legal arguments in
the judicial use of comparative law (Section 3.1.1).
Another view presents the comparison of policy choices
as most significant (Section 3.1.2).
3.1.1 Bell: Focus on the Comparison of Legal Arguments
John Bell has constructed an explanation of judicial cita-
tions of foreign law from the perspective of legal argu-
mentation. He argues that arguments based on foreign
legal ideas are used as supporting reasons for judicial
decisions, which add weight to a justification based on a
combination of arguments.61 According to Bell, compa-
rative legal analysis is useful for decisions on legal issues
on which the domestic law provides competing state-
ments. Arguments from comparative law then have a
certain weight in the accumulation of arguments. In this
regard, Bell explains:
The model of legal reasoning I have in mind is one
that depends on a combination of reasons, each of
which may be insufficient to justify the decision in its
own right, but, taken together, they provide support
for the decision. The analogy is with individual
threads of fibre. On its own, a single thread cannot
hold up a weight, but twisted in combination with
other threads, it forms a cord which can carry a sub-
stantial weight.62
Bell argues that an argument from foreign law functions
as a thread in the rope of legal reasoning. It ‘adds lustre
59. Compare F. Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’, 94 Virginia Law
Review 1931 (2008).
60. See inter alia A. Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Compara-
tive Law, 2nd edn. (1993); P. Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal
Transplants”’, 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law
111 (1997).
61. J. Bell, ‘The Argumentative Status of Foreign Legal Arguments’, 8
Utrecht Law Review 8, at 10 (2012, nr. 2).
62. Ibid.
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to an argument already available in the host legal sys-
tem’.63 He describes the incorporation of the foreign
legal argument as a process of ‘cross-fertilisation’, mean-
ing that:
an external stimulus promotes an evolution within
the receiving legal system. The evolution involves an
internal adaptation by the receiving legal system in its
own way. The new development is a distinctive but
organic product of that system rather than a bolt-on.64
This cross-fertilisation is possible if three criteria are
met. Firstly, the legal problem in the domestic system
must have an equivalent in the foreign legal system. The
legal position of children in context of same-sex mar-
riages, for example, can only be studied in legal systems
which allow same-sex marriages. Secondly, the argu-
ment from foreign law can only have weight in the legal
reasoning of a domestic case if it is consistent with the
legal principles of the domestic legal system. Finally, the
prestige of the foreign legal system, in the eyes of the
domestic judges and in the domestic society, influences
the weight which is given to arguments from foreign
law.65
Bell’s analysis seems to corroborate with the ideas of
‘featherweight comparison’ but also with those of ‘light-
weight comparison’, described above.66 His analysis
highlights the non-systematic nature of judicial compar-
isons and the relatively limited concern with interdisci-
plinary contextualisation. Firstly, Bell focuses on the
transplanting of legal arguments from one legal system
into another. In this regard, non-legal aspects, for exam-
ple, concerning the political or societal values of the
compared legal systems, provide the background to the
comparison of legal concepts. However, the comparison
focuses on the use of arguments relating to foreign legal
concepts in judicial reasoning concerning similar
domestic concepts. In this respect, the main focus of
judges concerns the construction of a legal argument
which ‘fits’ with the domestic legal system. Secondly,
Bell emphasises the inspirational nature of judicial com-
parisons, in which foreign legal sources ‘help us to
explore solutions that are out of the box from a domestic
law point of view’.67 Corresponding with the aims of law
reform and transnational harmonisation, judges can be
expected to look for comparative solutions where for-
eign laws might provide ‘better’ arguments or where it
is desirable for the domestic law to be in line with trans-
national legal development. In this respect, Bell argues
that comparative law adds force to arguments based on
domestic law ‘(t)o the extent that the social and political
situation of the foreign jurisdiction are similar to that of
the domestic law, i.e. are in some sense engaged in a
63. Ibid., at 11.
64. J. Bell, ‘Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of Administrative Law in
Europe’, in J. Beatson and T. Tridimas (eds.), New Directions in Europe-
an Public Law (1998) 147, at 147.
65. Bell, above n. 61, at 17.
66. See above, Section 2.2.3.
67. Bell, above n. 61, at 17.
common enterprise at some level of generality’.68 In this
view, it appears that the judicial use of comparative law
should focus on reaching more similar results between
legal systems and that general similarities between
national contexts are sufficient to make the comparative
analysis worthwhile.
3.1.2 Adams and Mak: Focus on the Comparison of
  Policy Choices
In another analysis, non-legal aspects take a more prom-
inent place in the judicial use of foreign law. Maurice
Adams and I have argued that judicial reasoning based
on comparative law primarily addresses policy choices,
involving ethical principles, societal interests, and poli-
tics.69 In this view, comparative legal analysis by courts
will generally focus on the legal interpretation of a spe-
cific legal concept in connection with the policy choices
which underlie this legal interpretation.70 This perspec-
tive corroborates with my research regarding the views
and approaches of judges regarding the use of compara-
tive law in judicial decision-making. This research has
clarified that judges in national highest courts consider
‘that the guiding influence of comparative legal materi-
als does not push them to follow the legal solutions
developed in another legal system’.71 They consider that
the particularities of national legal systems and individ-
ual cases require that a solution is developed which fits
these particularities. An interviewed Canadian Supreme
Court Justice observed that in the framework of compa-
rative legal analysis, it is useful to learn about the social
values which formed the context of the decision-making
of foreign courts.72
The necessity of studying policy choices related to for-
eign law is underlined by a judgment in which a contex-
tual study of this kind was absent. The English case of
White v. Jones concerned the question whether a solici-
tor could be held liable in tort law for neglecting to
change a will in time, as a result of which the intended
beneficiaries suffered the loss of not receiving the inher-
itance.73 In this case, Lord Goff presented a legal analy-
sis based on German law to support the argumentation
that the claim of the beneficiaries should be accepted.
However, this argument based on the analogy with Ger-
man law stands in a difficult relation to the English law
of obligations, which aims to limit the amount of claims
in tort law. The incongruence between the policy
choices underlying the English and German legal sys-
tems could explain the criticism and incomprehension
of White v. Jones voiced by English legal experts. The
judgment is considered an exception, and the transplant
68. Ibid., at 18, citing J. Waldron, ‘Treating Like Cases Alike in the World:
The Theoretical Basis of the Demand for Legal Unity’, in S. Muller and
S. Richards (eds.), Highest Courts and Globalisation (2010), at 99.
69. M. Adams and E. Mak, ‘Buitenlands recht in nationale rechtspleging:
onder welke voorwaarden is dat feitelijk nuttig en mogelijk?’, 86 Neder-
lands Juristenblad 2912, at 2916 (2011).
70. Ibid.
71. Mak, above n. 9, at 202.
72. Ibid., at 186.
73. White and another v. Jones and others [1995] UKHL 5.
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from German law could turn out to be a ‘legal irritant’
which does not stand the test of time.74
In accordance with the theoretical analysis made by Jane
Stapleton, Maurice Adams and I argue that the use of
foreign law is most useful with regard to the weighing of
arguments related to policy choices.75 Stapleton’s analy-
sis concerning tort law holds that (i) the motive underly-
ing legislation or a judgment usually can be traced back
to a policy choice; (ii) this policy choice is translated into
a legally relevant duty of care; and (iii) this legal norm
needs to be incorporated into the system of existing
legal rules.76 In this view, the use of comparative legal
analysis has the potential to provide useful insights in
fields of law in which policy choices fulfil a more signifi-
cant role than arguments related to the system of the
law. Examples are economic law, human rights law, and
legal issues concerning bio-ethics.77 The weight given to
the insights from the comparative analysis remains
dependent on its relation to the local context.
This view meets the ideas of ‘featherweight comparison’
and ‘lightweight comparison’, in the sense that the com-
parative legal analysis will most often not be systematic.
However, the attention given to the political and social
background of foreign legal systems, as expressed in
policy choices and interdisciplinary studies informing
these choices, takes a dimension which corresponds
more with the ‘heavier’ types of comparative legal analy-
sis.78 The analysis of case law in the next section aims to
bring further clarification regarding the actual practices
of national highest courts.
3.2 Examples from Case Law
This section explores the judicial use of comparative law
in light of the two theoretical views presented in the
previous section and the methodological considerations
outlined in Section 2. The use of interdisciplinary
insights in comparative legal analysis by courts is inves-
tigated here in relation to three examples, regarding the
acknowledgement of ‘wrongful life’ claims, the extradi-
tion of citizens to a legal system which applies the death
penalty, and the assessment of criminal responsibility in
case of wilful transmission of HIV infection. All three
examples were mentioned in interviews with judges
conducted for my research on the changing role of high-
est national courts in the globalised legal context.79 The
interviewed judges considered that the judgments in
these cases provided emblematic examples of judicial
approaches to the use of comparative law. Moreover, the
selected cases concern legal issues which are closely con-
nected with contextual aspects regarding moral and
societal views in national legal systems as well as with
empirical questions. Although the analysis in this sec-
tion does not allow for drawing general conclusions, the
74. Adams and Mak, above n. 69, at 2917.
75. J. Stapleton, ‘Benefits of Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in Transla-
tion’, 1 Journal of Tort Law, at 2 and 44 (2007, nr. 3, article 6).
76. Ibid.
77. Adams and Mak, above n. 69, at 2918.
78. See above, Section 2.2.3.
79. Mak, above n. 9.
selection of these specific examples makes it possible to
obtain a better understanding of the role of contextual
aspects in the legal reasoning and methodological
choices of highest courts regarding the use of compara-
tive law.
3.2.1 ‘Wrongful Life’
A first clear example of the context-dependent nature of
judgments of courts in different countries is provided
by an overview of judgments in ‘wrongful life’ claims.
These cases concern the claims for damages in the name
of a severely handicapped child born as a result of an
incorrect diagnosis during the mother’s pregnancy,
based on which the pregnancy has not been terminated.
Research by Ivo Giesen clarifies how courts in different
jurisdictions have examined foreign case law in their
process of decision-making in this type of case.80
The case law of the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad)
provides a pertinent example in this regard. This Court
is one of the few courts in the world which has allowed a
claim for damages on the basis of wrongful life. The
Hoge Raad’s deliberations in the case of Baby Kelly
were informed by an extensive comparative legal analy-
sis presented by Advocate-General Hartkamp in his
advisory opinion to the Court.81 Although the Court as
a convention does not refer to comparative legal sources
in its judgments, it is certain that the judges have taken
the Advocate General’s analysis into account in their
deliberations.82 This analysis extensively discussed
available case law from Germany, France, and the Unit-
ed Kingdom and mentioned further examples from Bel-
gium, Australia, the United States, and Israel.83 The
comparative legal study seems to have been informed by
the Advocate General’s knowledge of and access to for-
eign case law as well as by academic literature and the
materials presented by counsel.84 The overview of for-
eign case law focussed on the interpretation of the rele-
vant provisions of tort law, mentioning the considera-
tions given by foreign courts to moral arguments and
national policies of tort law.85 However, the Advocate-
General did not discuss differences between legal con-
cepts, such as the meaning of ‘duty of care’ in the com-
mon law system of the United Kingdom. Also, political
and societal debate in the examined jurisdictions was
only taken into account to a limited extent.86 Moreover,
the Advocate-General did not refer to the outcomes of
the comparative legal analysis in his advice regarding
the adequate solution of the case of Baby Kelly on the
basis of Dutch tort law.87
80. I. Giesen, ‘The Use and Influence of Comparative Law in “Wrongful
Life” Cases’, 8 Utrecht Law Review 35 (2012, nr. 2).
81. Baby Kelly HR 18 March 2005, NJ 206, 606.
82. Giesen, above n. 80, at 46.
83. HR 18 March 2005, NJ 206, 606, conclusion of Advocate-General Hart-
kamp, at 23-32.
84. Ibid., at 24.
85. See for example ibid., at 30 (concerning English case law).
86. See for example ibid., at 31 (reference to the adoption of the ‘Anti-Per-
ruche Act’ in France, which formed a legislative response to the award-
ing of damages by the Cour de cassation in a ‘wrongful life’ case).
87. Ibid., at 33-58.
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Giesen has observed that the ‘wrongful life’ judgments
of courts around the world diverge. As an explanation
for this divergence between judicial decisions, he offers
the following argument:
that comparative law is not capable of providing a
definite answer to the question of which arguments
are the most valid, most convincing and decisive, at
least not in tort law issues of the magnitude of wrong-
ful life claims. It is instead the weight which a certain
argument receives in a certain cultural setting or back-
ground, in a certain environment drenched in ages of
promoting specific legal policies that seems to decide
the matter. Hence, it is what I call the politics of a tort
law system that governs the outcomes and the solu-
tions reached in these sorts of cases.88
Seen from this perspective, differences between judg-
ments of national highest courts in different jurisdic-
tions on similar legal issues relate to differences between
national policies. However, the tort law policies of other
jurisdictions are not necessarily studied in the judicial
analysis of foreign legal arguments. Indeed, the method-
ology of comparative legal analysis used by highest
courts in wrongful life cases seems to consist mostly of a
‘featherweight comparison’, in which foreign case law is
studied in a non-systematic way as a source of legal
arguments which can be used either for or against the
judgment in the domestic case. The domestic perspec-
tive is central to this analysis. In this respect, practices
of highest courts in wrongful life cases correspond with
Bell’s view in their emphasis on the relative weight of
comparative legal arguments. However, the use of com-
parative law in these cases seems less aimed at the devel-
opment of ‘universal’ solutions than Bell supposes.
The example of wrongful life cases clarifies that policies,
as well as other contextual elements, are not always
explicitly referred to in comparative legal analysis for
the benefit of judicial decision-making. A second exam-
ple provides a different view with regard to case law
addressing fundamental principles of criminal and con-
stitutional law.
3.2.2 Extradition and Possible Capital Punishment
In this example, the Supreme Court of Canada consid-
ered facts and policies connected to foreign legal sys-
tems, in particular the United States, in order to con-
struct a point of reference for the interpretation of the
domestic law. The case United States v. Burns concerned
the requested extradition of two Canadians to the Unit-
ed States, where these persons could be sentenced to
death. In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada looked
at international opinion and at the experiences of other
states.89 The Canadian court eventually decided that it
was unconstitutional under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms to extradite the persons in question if no
assurances were given that the death sentence would not
88. Giesen, above n. 80, at 37.
89. United States v. Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283.
be imposed or carried out.90 This decision was reached
partly on the basis of international sources. It over-
turned earlier judgments of the Canadian Supreme
Court, in which the extradition of US residents was not
prevented.91
The Burns judgment cites international experience and
the policies in other countries, which have also abolish-
ed the death penalty. It appears that these references to
like-minded systems are used to strengthen the Court’s
decision to overturn its previous case law. In order to
support its judgment even more, the Court emphasises
the isolated position of the US states in which the death
penalty is still imposed. In this respect, an empirical
connotation can be identified in this quantitative assess-
ment concerning the legal systems which apply the
death penalty. The Court’s reasoning is as follows:
International experience, particularly in the past dec-
ade, has shown the death penalty to raise many com-
plex problems of both a philosophical and pragmatic
nature. While there remains the fundamental issue of
whether the state can ever be justified in taking the
life of a human being within its power, the present
debate goes beyond arguments over the effectiveness
of deterrence and the appropriateness of vengeance
and retribution. It strikes at the very ability of the
criminal justice system to obtain a uniformly correct
result even where death hangs in the balance.
International experience thus confirms the validity of
concerns expressed in the Canadian Parliament about
capital punishment. It also shows that a rule requir-
ing that assurances be obtained prior to extradition in
death penalty cases not only accords with Canada’s
principled advocacy on the international level, but is
also consistent with the practice of other countries
with whom Canada generally invites comparison,
apart from the retentionist jurisdictions in the United
States.92
Interestingly, foreign factual experience concerning
potential wrongful convictions was invoked in the Burns
judgment as one of the arguments justifying the Court’s
reversal of its Kindler and Ng jurisprudence, in which
extradition to the United States had been allowed. In
this respect, the judgment not only relied on a compara-
tive analysis of legal rules and underlying policies. It
also took into account arguments with an empirical con-
notation, which require a non-legal approach.93 The
Supreme Court of Canada reasoned:
The outcome of this appeal turns on an appreciation
of the principles of fundamental justice, which in
turn are derived from the basic tenets of our legal
system. These basic tenets have not changed since
1991 when Kindler and Ng were decided, but their
90. Ibid., at 143-44.
91. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 SCR 779; Reference re
Ng Extradition (Canada) [1991] 2 SCR 858.
92. [2001] 1 SCR 283, at 127-28.
93. See above, Section 2.2.2.
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application in particular cases (the ‘balancing pro-
cess’) must take note of factual developments in Can-
ada and in relevant foreign jurisdictions. When prin-
ciples of fundamental justice as established and
understood in Canada are applied to these factual
developments, many of which are of far-reaching
importance in death penalty cases, a balance which
tilted in favour of extradition without assurances in
Kindler and Ng now tilts against the constitutionality
of such an outcome. For these reasons, the appeal is
dismissed.94
Three observations can be made with regard to this
judgment. Firstly, the approach of the Supreme Court
of Canada in this case seems to align more with the view
of Adams and me than with the view of Bell concerning
the use of comparative law in judicial reasoning. Indeed,
the comparative aspect of the case did not so much con-
cern the judicial interpretation of a legal concept in dif-
ferent systems, but rather the developed practices (or
policies) of governments concerning extradition. Sec-
ondly, the empirical elements included in the Court’s
considerations were not backed up with references to
available studies from non-legal disciplines (for exam-
ple, studies in sociology or political science). In this
sense, the Court’s approach qualifies as a ‘featherweight
comparison’, lacking both a systematic analysis of for-
eign law and a thorough contextual analysis of foreign
systems on the basis of interdisciplinary insights. Final-
ly, the comparison between the legal systems of Canada
and the United States concerns an intra-cultural com-
parison of legal systems belonging to the common law
family, which implies that a firm common ground for
legal comparison existed.
3.2.3 Criminal Responsibility for HIV Infection
A third example of comparative legal research in judicial
decision-making can be found in the Hoge Raad’s case
law regarding the doctrine of conditional intent (voor-
waardelijk opzet). Legal questions about the interpreta-
tion of this doctrine arose in cases concerning the
alleged attempt to commit manslaughter through the
wilful transmission of HIV infection.95 Concerning the
application of this doctrine in new circumstances, the
judges of the Criminal Law Chamber have sought inspi-
ration in German law, and in the HIV cases also French,
Austrian, Canadian, and Australian sources were
brought to the attention of the judges by the Advocate-
General.96 Regarding the HIV cases, a balancing act was
required between the policy preference to keep these
cases outside of the criminal law process, on the one
hand, and the legal acceptance of a broader conception
of ‘conditional intent’, on the other hand. The judgment
94. [2001] 1 SCR 283, at 144.
95. HIV-I HR 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552; HIV-II HR 24 June 2003, NJ
2003, 555; HIV-III HR 18 January 2005, NJ 2005, 154; HIV-IV HR 20
February 2007, NJ 2007, 313.
96. See for example HIV-IV HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 313, conclu-
sion of Advocate-General Bleichrodt, at 3.7.7, in which German and
Swiss law are analysed.
indicates that the German approach to this question was
influential on the decision-making of the Hoge Raad,
but in the end, a different solution was chosen for the
Netherlands.
Indeed, the judgment in HIV-IV reveals that the Hoge
Raad gave weight to the policy preferences expressed by
the Dutch government. The Hoge Raad took into
account the reserve which needs to be adopted in
accepting criminal liability for endangering behaviour
like that which had occurred in this case. As a reason for
this reserve, the Court mentioned public health interests
regarding the particular situation of the danger of HIV
contamination. The Court explicitly referred to the
views of the involved ministers.97
Again, some observations can be made. Firstly, the com-
parative legal analysis focused on national policies
underlying a similar legal concept. Also, the German
interpretation of ‘conditional intent’ was not cited by
the Hoge Raad and therefore was not used to strengthen
the judicial reasoning. In this sense, the judicial use of
comparative law seems to fit better with the view of
Adams and me than with the view of Bell. Secondly, the
Court referred to statistical analyses concerning the
probability of HIV infection in circumstances similar to
those of the case. Here, the legal question’s empirical
connotation required that such information was consult-
ed, regardless of the inclusion of a comparative analysis
in the Court’s reasoning.98 Finally, the example of the
HIV cases clarifies that the Hoge Raad focuses on com-
parisons with the legal sources of other Continental
European legal systems, in particular its neighbour Ger-
many, although some sources from common law sys-
tems are considered as well. These examples indicate
that the Court prefers intra-cultural comparisons. The
prominence of German law in comparative legal analysis
suggests that the judges of the Hoge Raad favour com-
parisons at the third level identified by Van Hoecke and
Warrington, where ‘concrete comparison of statutory
and judicial rules of behaviour can be fruitful, because
the context, the legal culture, is very similar … whereas
the conceptual framework and legal language are also to
a large extent the same’.99
3.3 Intermediary Conclusion
The presented examples of comparative legal analysis in
judicial decision-making connect with the second aim,
identified above,100 for conducting comparative legal
research, that is, the use of comparative legal analysis as
a source of inspiration for national legal practice. Fitting
with this aim, the courts in the examined cases primarily
use the methodological approach of ‘featherweight com-
parison’. However, in some instances, the study of for-
eign case law is somewhat more contextualised and
includes consideration of the legal cultures of other
jurisdictions and of relevant factual information. Inter-
97. See HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 313, at 4.4, which cites Kamer-
stukken II 2004-2005, 29 800 VI, nr. 157, at 5-9.
98. See above, Section 2.2.2.
99. Van Hoecke and Warrington, above n. 3, at 533.
100. See above, Section 2.2.3.
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disciplinary insights are sometimes taken into account
regarding legal questions with an empirical connotation,
but this type of analysis is not necessarily connected
with a comparative approach. The examples corroborate
the idea that courts will not transplant foreign legal so-
lutions into the domestic law. Finally, the courts seem
to focus primarily on comparisons with legal systems
belonging to the same legal family or legal culture.
The examples discussed in this section have provided
insight into the judicial use of comparative law and the
characteristics of comparative legal reasoning. Based on
this analysis, some further observations can be made
concerning the role and method of interdisciplinary




Which lessons does the judicial use of comparative law
hold for comparative legal research generally, in particu-
lar concerning the incorporation of interdisciplinary
insights in legal analysis? In order to answer this ques-
tion, this section will first address the conditions relat-
ing to the aim and role of comparative legal analysis in
judging (Section 4.1) and next to the methodology of
comparative legal analysis in this context (Section 4.2).
4.1 Aim and Role of Comparative Legal
Analysis
The analysis in the previous section has confirmed that
comparative legal analysis in judicial decision-making is
conducted with a particular aim, that is, the search for
inspiration from foreign legal arguments for the decid-
ing of domestic cases. The analysis has further clarified
that the approach of judges, mostly a ‘featherweight
comparison’, is geared to this aim. The aim of compara-
tive legal scholarship was described above as the obtain-
ing of knowledge through a thorough and contextual
comparison of two or more legal systems. The method-
ology of comparative legal analysis is essentially similar
for both judging and scholarship, to the extent that legal
interpretation and the better understanding of domestic
legal concepts are involved. However, a relevant point to
consider is that choices made regarding the use of com-
parative legal analysis differ on the basis of underlying
motives and approaches of judges when compared to
legal scholars.
Judges have several motives for conducting comparative
research and for selecting specific foreign legal systems
in this research. These motives concern the search for
inspiration for the deciding of a difficult legal question,
often combined with the public importance of the case.
Furthermore, judges are interested in learning about
‘best practices’ developed by their foreign peers and
they want to coordinate the development of domestic
case law with legal development at the transnational lev-
el.101 Still, judges do not form a homogeneous group.
Indeed, judges in national supreme courts and constitu-
tional courts hold different views concerning the legiti-
macy and usefulness of the use of comparative law in
judicial decision-making.102 Some judges have reserva-
tions regarding the use of comparative law in judicial
decision-making, whereas other judges have a more
open attitude.103 Reservations can concern the authori-
tative value of foreign legal arguments or scepticism
regarding the guidance which can be derived from com-
parative law. Judges with a more open attitude are not
necessarily in favour of striving for convergence with
the laws of other countries or with international law.
Indeed, and befitting the balanced nature of the judicial
function, the majority of the judges have a nuanced
approach regarding the use of non-binding foreign law
in judicial decision-making. These judges are of the
opinion that it is sometimes useful to engage with for-
eign law.104 For all judges, the time-consuming nature
of comparative legal research might be a reason for
abstaining from an inquiry into foreign legal sources.105
In sum, factors taken into account in judicial choices
include the perceived usefulness of comparative law in
the deciding of a specific case and the available time and
resources for comparative legal analysis.
The judicial use of comparative law might come to
resemble legal scholarship more if a ‘heavier’ method of
comparison were developed. In this respect, Jeremy
Waldron has presented a more principled argument for
the judicial study of foreign law. He has advanced a
principle of equal treatment of parties in similar cases
occurring in different jurisdictions.106 John Bell has cor-
rectly pointed out that the acceptance of such a princi-
ple implies agreement on ‘a more substantial function’
of the law, such as the protection of human rights or the
promotion of human well-being.107 In Waldron’s analy-
sis, the achievement of equal treatment demands of
courts to do two things: (i) to compare their methods of
decision-making with those of courts in foreign jurisdic-
tions and draw lessons from this comparison and (ii) to
compare the content of judgments and draw insights for
the deciding of domestic cases.108 However, available
studies of judicial practices, as well as the examples from
case law discussed in this article, suggest that courts
currently do not apply this more thorough method of
legal comparison.
4.2 Methodology of Comparative Legal Analysis
Regarding the incorporation of non-legal insights, com-
parative legal analysis in judicial decision-making
encounters the ‘common’ incorporation problems of
legal scholarship, including arbitrariness of the selection
101. Mak, above n. 9, at 201.
102. Ibid., at 227-30.
103. Compare V. Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era
(2009).
104. Mak, above n. 9, at 229-30.
105. Ibid., at 232-33.
106. Waldron, above n. 68.
107. Bell, above n. 61, at 14.
108. Ibid.
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and interpretation of court cases, possibly related to
implicit ideological or political views; incorrect ideas
about social reality and human psychology; or subjective
reasoning.109 Lessons transpire, in this regard, from an
analysis of the methodological considerations of judges
concerning the inclusion of comparative legal sources in
the reasoning of judgments and concerning the selection
of sources.
Firstly, a relevant difference exists between common
law courts and Continental European courts with regard
to the style of judicial reasoning. For reasons of tradi-
tion and the requirement of a unanimous decision, judg-
ments in civil law systems, such as The Netherlands and
France, tend to be relatively short. In this light, the cita-
tion of foreign law would be exceptional. Indeed, some
judges are of the opinion that the citation of foreign law
might weaken the reasoning of a judgment because of
possible criticism of the highest court’s choices, for
example, with regard to the selection of examined juris-
dictions and the authority of arguments found through
the legal comparison.110 The citation of foreign legal
materials is more easily accepted in common law courts,
which stand in the tradition of law development through
case law and which permit individual judges to issue
their own opinion on cases. Judges in common law sys-
tems will cite all arguments which they consider to be
persuasive, based on the idea that the judge owes a duty
to counsel to explain why their arguments are not accept-
ed.111 A question of concern amongst judges in these
courts is the question of whether a presentation of com-
parative legal arguments in the court’s reasoning should
consist of a ‘full’ discussion of all materials found or
whether the court is allowed to mention only those for-
eign references which support its own decision. British
judges have indicated that they do not find the latter
approach problematic, while some American judges
have criticised the use of foreign law if it consists of
‘cherry picking’.112 Still, these judges seem to agree on
the point that the discussion of foreign law in the judi-
cial deliberations should be as comprehensive as possi-
ble.
Concerning methodology, secondly, the selection of
legal systems for the comparison is also significant.
Selection is inherent to comparative law, since ‘nobody
can compare everything in the world of laws’.113 In this
regard, considerations of judges are similar to those of
legal scholars. Firstly, legal tradition plays a role. The
genealogical relation between common law systems
makes it more natural for the highest courts in these sys-
tems, for example, in Canada and the United States, to
look to each other for inspiration than to legal systems
which do not share this background. The exchange
109. See other contributions to this special issue.
110. Mak, above n. 9, at 231.
111. A. Touffait and A. Tunc, ‘Pour une motivation plus explicite des déci-
sions de justice notamment de celles de la Cour de cassation’, 72 Revue
trimestrielle de droit civil 491 (1974).
112. See for example ‘Judge John Roberts Confirmation Hearings’, available
at <www. gpo. gov>, last accessed 4 November 2015.
113. Siems, above n. 2, at 6.
between courts in these jurisdictions, furthermore, is
made easier by their shared language. Highest courts in
Continental European civil law systems, by contrast,
most often study foreign sources which originated in
other civil law jurisdictions. The Dutch courts, for
example, consider that the French and German influ-
ences in the Dutch legal system provide reasons for
looking to these systems first when engaging in a com-
parative legal study. Besides legal tradition and lan-
guage, judges also take into account the prestige of spe-
cific foreign courts when selecting case law for a legal
comparison.114 Finally, practical constraints, such as
knowledge of foreign systems and their background and
the time available for comparative research, are signifi-
cant. Concerning knowledge of foreign law, legal schol-
ars have more opportunities to develop a body of knowl-
edge. However, a considerable number of judges in
supreme courts and constitutional courts have a back-
ground in academia and can build on knowledge
obtained during this previous career. Regarding time
constraints, judges are under greater pressure than legal
scholars.
In sum, this analysis of judicial views and methodologi-
cal choices clarifies that judges relate their approaches
regarding the use of foreign law mostly to the require-
ments and methods of legal research generally. Non-
legal aspects, such as historical connections and the
political and societal context of foreign legal systems, are
considered in order to collect materials which can form
the basis for a useful comparative analysis. However, the
attention given to the analysis of foreign law and non-
legal aspects in the deciding of cases is limited, because
of the nature of the comparative legal analysis and time
constraints affecting the judicial work.
5 Concluding Remarks
This article has analysed how contextual aspects of for-
eign law can be taken into account in comparative legal
research. A theoretical analysis of the inherent interdis-
ciplinary nature of comparative law was followed by an
illustration of the role and method of interdisciplinary
incorporation in comparative legal analysis conducted
by Western highest courts. This analysis provides a
clarification with regard to three aspects of comparative
legal methodology encompassing interdisciplinary ele-
ments:
1. What is compared in comparative legal research and
to what extent do similarities and differences exist in
this regard between legal scholars and judges? The
analysis in this article revealed that a meaningful
comparison of legal rules and case law from different
jurisdictions can only be achieved if relevant aspects
of the historical, political, economic, and social con-
text of the compared legal systems are taken into
account. In this regard, comparative legal analysis
114. Mak, above n. 9, at 206.
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requires the study of contextual insights provided by
non-legal academic disciplines. The relevance of con-
text is illustrated clearly by the developed practices of
courts regarding the use of comparative law. In these
judicial practices, the study of policy choices under-
lying foreign case law plays a significant role. For
legal scholars, this experience from legal practice
underlines the importance of sufficient contextualisa-
tion of comparative research in order to draw conclu-
sions for the benefit of concrete cases as well as
broader political and societal debate. Indeed, there is
a connection here between legal scholarship and
judging. Legal scholars can assist judicial decision-
making by providing judges with information about
the laws and case law of foreign jurisdictions. In this
respect, comparative legal research conducted by
scholars contributes to the soundness of comparative
legal analysis in judicial decision-making.
2. Why do legal scholars and judges use comparative
legal analysis? Comparative legal analysis can have
different aims, connected with a ‘scale’ of methods
ranging from ‘featherweight’ to ‘heavyweight’ legal
comparison. Along this scale, interdisciplinary incor-
poration becomes increasingly important in the com-
parative legal analysis. The article clarified that
knowledge building in legal scholarship generally
provides most reason and opportunity for the discus-
sion of insights from non-legal disciplines. At the
other end of the spectrum, comparative legal analysis
as a source of inspiration for judicial decision-making
or law reform is connected with a smaller basis of
legitimacy and with fewer resources for the conduct-
ing of a systematic and contextualised analysis. When
considering the use of comparative law in legal prac-
tice, it is important to take into account the individual
approaches of those involved in the application or
reform of laws. In this respect, the article clarified
that the individual approaches of judges have an
influence on the extent to which comparative legal
analysis, and interdisciplinary aspects connected with
this analysis, play a role in judicial deliberations and
the reasoning of judgments. Judges with an ‘open’
attitude concerning the use of comparative legal anal-
ysis emphasise the usefulness in finding inspiration
for domestic decision-making, even though the study
of foreign law cannot provide solutions for domestic
cases. These judges will engage in comparative legal
analysis more often than judges with a ‘closed’ atti-
tude, even if this analysis is time-consuming and not
absolutely necessary for the solution of the domestic
case.
3. In which ways can legal scholarship make sense of the
use of interdisciplinary elements in comparative legal
analysis, in particular: how can legal scholars analyse
the use of comparative law by judges? The analysis in
this article used legal theory and referred to research
in the fields of comparative law and socio-legal stud-
ies to provide answers to the research question and
sub-question. The analysis suggests that scholars
have an important role in the further contextualisa-
tion of comparative legal research regarding specific
legal issues, both through legal-doctrinal analysis and
through socio-legal comparative analysis.115 Regard-
ing the study of the judicial use of comparative legal
analysis, the method of qualitative interviewing
seems suitable for an analysis of the societal and psy-
chological background of the examined judicial prac-
tices. In particular, this approach enables the collec-
tion of information on the use of comparative legal
analysis even in courts where explicit citations of for-
eign judgments are rare. Moreover, interviews can
give insight into the motives of judges regarding the
use of comparative legal analysis. Future comparative
and socio-legal research will contribute to a growing
body of academic literature, which includes compara-
tive legal research of judicial citations to foreign law
in jurisdictions in Central and Eastern Europe;116
analyses of the exchange of legal ideas and experien-
ces in transnational judicial networks;117 and quanti-
tative research, revealing patterns of judicial citations
to foreign law.118 The further development of inter-
disciplinary research on judicial citations serves a
broad aim, as it could provide valuable results for a
better understanding of the development of the law
under the effects of globalisation.119
In sum, awareness of the interdisciplinary aspect of
comparative legal analysis, as well as further debate and
research on legal methodology, can help scholars and
judges to avoid being pulled down by the ‘under toad’ of
incorrect use of the comparative legal method.
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